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Abstract: This paper presents a conception of personhood as both physical and 
social, and both as radically contingent upon their respective physical and social 
environments. In the context of age-related cognitive decline, particularly demen-
tia, it supports literature suggesting social personhood is occluded rather than de-
teriorating with brain function. Value sensitive design (VSD) applied to assistive 
technologies for people with age-related cognitive decline, has focused upon 
physical support. The paper concludes that issues of power must be grasped by 
those in VSD practice in order to reorient VSD in assistive technologies to also 
support social personhood. 
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Introduction 
The contribution of this article is a reconsideration of Personhood. It is occluded, not 
erased, in age-related cognitive decline, and therefore value sensitive design (VSD) for 
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assistive technologies needs to focus especially upon enhancing and revealing person-
hood. Thus the research question addressed is ‘How can Value Sensitive Design improve 
assistive technologies to value personhood better than assistive technologies built without 
VSD?’ 
Conceptual lens: Physical personhood 
The philosophical backdrop to the definition of personhood the authors have discussed 
elsewhere (Krepset al 2016; Kreps 2018) and we would kindly refer the reader to this 
discussion rather than repeat it here, beyond a simple assertion of the reality of subjective 
consciousness. In this paper we wish to stress our contention that human individuals are 
both radically contingent, and unique. This seemingly paradoxical state occurs on both 
the physical, biological and the non-physical, or social, levels of human existence. 
The physical part of our personhood, our biological bodies – including our brains – exist 
within restless ecologies of sustenance, growth, maintenance, programmed cell death, 
renewal, and waste. Our individual cells are continually growing, maturing, dying off: 
much of us is completely replaced many times during the course of our lives. (Cooper 
and Hausman 2007:689-690). Our physicalityis radically contingent upon our continued 
ingestion of the outer world, its processing into the self-renewal of the cells of our body, 
and the expulsion of waste back out into the world around us. “Humans possess a total of 
approximately 1014 cells” of more than two hundred types (Cooper and Hausman 
2007:689). Red blood cells live for about four months. Colon cells die off after about four 
days. Brain cells, the inner lens cells of the eye, and the muscle cells of the heart, last for 
most of our lives. The rest is far more transient, subject to continual self-renewal. All 
these molecules and cells require elements of the air, sunlight, food and drink we ingest, 
daily, both for growth and for their various functions, including those functions govern-
ing the processing and discard of waste. The essential truism is that our physicality is 
largely fluid – a collection of temporarily captured solids (in a form that is about 60% 
water) in a common pattern that defines us as specimens of genus homo sapiens. 
Yet, of course, our (constantly self-replicating) fingerprints, the patterns of our irises, and 
a host of other molecular and genetic markers are unique to each of us: for all the radical 
contingency described above our own special patterning of the flow of matter through us 
is nonetheless unique. It is our own, unique, ‘dissipative structure’.  Such dissipative 
structures occur throughout the living world. Evolutionary biologist Brian Goodwin’s 
simple image of the dissipative structure is perhaps useful, here, as a reminder: picture a 
tap running into a bath; the water forms a spiral as it runs down the open plughole. The 
spiral is a dissipative structure. It could be oil or wine pouring down the plughole; the 
dissipative structure would be the same (with perhaps minor differences in speed and 
angle). The structure is not dependent upon its contents and exists only as they pass 
through it (Goodwin 1994:9-10). Such dissipative structures are the very stuff of life, 
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visible in both the biology and behavior of all living systems. So, the human individual is 
physically – biologically - a dissipative structure, with only a very few parts lasting its 
(one) entire lifetime. 
Conceptual lens: Social personhood 
Our (non-physical) social personhood, similarly, is also radically contingent: our atti-
tudes, our languages, our values, knowledge, skills are all absorbed, not just in childhood, 
but throughout our lives, and passed on, from and to those around us, through the pheno-
menon of human communication and socialisation: we are radically social beings. Post-
structural thinkers since the 1960s – most especially Michel Foucault – have given us an 
extraordinarily detailed picture of the myriad ways in which the contents of this social 
personhood are determined by the social milieu in which we find ourselves (Foucault 
1977:135-170).  Essentially, the social personhood is defined through our relationships, 
and specifically through the power relations between us. But, of course, each of us is also 
unique - our own particular kaleidoscope of the social, our own special fusion of all the 
influences upon us (and our influences upon others) at any particular time in our lives. 
One might say that our social personhood, too, is a dissipative structure, composed of the 
many influences we absorb and extend, growing and changing as we discard aspects of 
our younger selves and develop more mature characteristics. 
Now, the relationship between these dissipative structures - the physical body and brain, 
and the non-physical, social personhood - has been focus of debate amongst philosophers 
and scientists for centuries, but some contemporary philosophers and neuroscientists are 
approaching common ground from their respective corners, to acknowledge that our 
psychical life, while bound to its motor accompaniment, is not governed by it. Or, as neu-
roscientist Benjamin Libet puts it, the “determinist materialist view” that would reduce us 
to ‘a pack of neurons’ “is a belief system; it is not a scientific theory that has been veri-
fied by direct tests”. On the contrary, “the nonphysical nature of subjective awareness, 
including the feelings of spirituality, creativity, conscious will, and imagination, is not 
describable or explainable directly by the physical evidence alone” (Libet 2009:5). 
But, of course, although not determined by the motor accompaniment of body and brain, 
our mental and emotional lives are nonetheless bound to them. The biological process 
ofself-renewal is not fixed, or even the same from individual to individual, and its effi-
ciency changes with age. The processes of apoptosis by which cells undergo programmed 
cell death begin to accelerate, as we grow older, internally protecting against tumour 
growth. But at the same time many cells also become senescent – “the state where cells 
have irreversibly lost their proliferation ability” and become resistant to apoptosis (Lu et 
al 2012). Molecular damage in cells begins to proliferate, too; many cells try to go on 
undertaking their function longer than they were meant to, unable to self-renew; prob-
ORBIT Journal DOI: https://doi.org/10.29297/orbit.v2i2.79  4 
lems mount up. “The number of senescent cells increases in tissues with aging” (Lu et al 
2012). 
Age-related cognitive decline occludes social person-
hood 
Fascinatingly, underlining the description made above of the relationship between our 
physical and non-physical personhood, age-related cognitive decline – the processes of 
aging taking place in the brain - has been shown, in the literature of recent years, not to 
erase, but to occlude our social personhood (Kitwood 1997:54-69). Essentially, as the 
physical motor accompaniment to our mental and emotional lives begins to deteriorate, 
our social personhood, that separate non-physical reality made up of our relationships, 
does not itself deteriorate, as if it were somehow contained or made up of the physical 
cells whose life-processes are coming to an end: instead it becomes harder to reach, shin-
ing in moments of lucidity through the relationships those with cognitive decline main-
tain with their relatives and carers. The common picture of dementia from decades gone 
by, that as the mental processes gradually collapse an individual’s personhood also va-
nishes, therefore, is a misconception, and indeed it has been challenged in the medical 
literature since at least the 1990s (Jenkins and Price 1996; Tappen et al 1999;Kontos 
2005; Fazio & Mitchell 2009; Palmer 2013). 
Assistive technologies, then, those smart devices of the internet age appearing in every 
nook and cranny of the social world, and already marching boldly into the care of elderly 
people, can be designed in one of two ways: to support the physical functioning of bodies 
whose self-renewal mechanisms are almost exhausted; or to support the continuing rela-
tionships and social personhood of the individual whose motor accompaniment is reach-
ing its natural end. The former approach focuses too exclusively upon the physical and 
belongs to the misconception of dementia of past decades. The latter approach acknowl-
edges fully the persistence of social personhood in those with cognitive decline and seeks 
to support their relatives, carers, and all the relationships that maintain personhood in its 
last years, months and days. 
Value Sensitive Design 
VSD employs an iterative, tripartite methodology that integrates conceptual, empirical, 
and technical investigations. It takes an interactional stance toward technology and hu-
man values, in which values are sought from both direct and indirect stakeholders. It dis-
tinguishes these from designer values and seeks to explicitly support these human values 
by the technology, in an integrative manner which involves a co-evolution of technology 
and social structure (Friedman et al 2015; Friedman et al 2016; Friedman et al 2017; Mil-
ler et al 2007). 
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It is focused on moral and social values discovery and designing technology to ensure 
those values are met. Therefore,it is particularly relevant to assistive technology for social 
personhood. Yet this does not appear to be a consideration at present in the VSD litera-
ture. As a technology development approach focused upon human values, it should, when 
applied to assistive technologies for people with dementia and those with age-related 
cognitive decline more generally, focus upon supporting relationships, and upon respect-
ing the personhood of those at the end of their physical lives. 
There have been three previous reviews of VSD, but none of those examined issues of 
cognitive decline with ageing. One examined applications, adaptations and critiques of 
VSD (Davis and Nathan 2015); both the authors of this examination received their docto-
rates at the VSD laboratory in Seattle, under the supervision of Prof Friedman, the found-
er of VSD. Another reviewed methods and theoretical aspects of VSD (van der Hoven et 
al 2015); that author did an internship at the VSD laboratory in Seattle, under the supervi-
sion of Prof Friedman. The third was a review of information systems, science and tech-
nology studies, media studies and computer ethics, involving VSD (Snyder et al 2016). 
More recently there was a comprehensive survey of VSD, for which the lead author was 
its founder (Friedman, et. al. 2017). This tome reviewed the development of the field and 
listed all major areas of VSD focus, citing key authors and contributions to the literature 
for each such area. Thus, it has been possible to examine contributions in those areas re-
levant to this study, and in that process to look at works published by those same key 
people, since the time of the survey in 2017. Pertinent to this study, there has been a sig-
nificant focus on studies involving people with dementia (Burmeister, 2016; Felzmann et. 
al. 2015; Koldrack et. al. 2014; Kreps et. al. 2016; Niemeijer et. al. 2014; Pakrasi et. al. 
2015; Schikhof et. al. 2010; Teipel et al., 2016), as well as cognitive decline with ageing 
more generally (Alzheimer Europe, 2010; Begum et. al. 2015; Burmeister, Bernoth, 
Dietsch, & Cleary, 2016; Castillo  et. al. 2011; Castillo et. al. 2014; Cremers et. al. 2014; 
Fukushima et. al. 2005; Harvie et. al. 2016; Jenkins & Draper, 2015; Koldrack et al., 
2014; Schikhof & Mulder, 2008), and more recently, there have been attempts to refor-
mulate VSD to caring for people more generally, through a variant known as Care Cen-
tered VSD (CCVSD)(Poulsen &Burmeister, 2019; Sharkey, 2016; van Wynsberghe, 
2013, 2015). 
These areas of VSD research have revealed many complexities in designing assistive, 
monitoring, and other care technologies for people with age related cognitive decline. 
The recent focus on CCVSD, and its associated focus on engineering care robotic assis-
tance, has shown that there are many areas that still need further exploration in relation to 
the social dynamics of robotic interaction with humans, when providing care. However, 
all of the work to date has followed the paradigm of supporting physical function and 
appears to accept the view that people with dementia in particular will experience further 
decline in capacity, mental and physical. The idea that personhood also has a social di-
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mension is not yet reflected in the VSD literature and this is a contribution made by the 
present article. As is borne out by the above VSDliterature, the focus of VSD to date has 
been on physically supportive technology - designed to support the physical functioning 
of bodies whose self-renewal mechanisms are almost exhausted – rather than supporting 
the continuing relationships and social personhood of the individual whose motor accom-
paniment is reaching its end. Clearly, more is needed in the area of social personhood 
support, which is not addressed in any of those articles. The question, then, is why has 
attention in VSD circles been so exclusively upon the physical? Our contention is that 
issues of power in the understanding and application of technology are at play, and that a 
better understanding of such issues is required if VSD is to overcome this deficit. 
Power and technology 
The multiple tendrils of the network of relationships - the web in which the spider of our 
social personhood sits – is, as Foucault underlined(1977:135-170) - a network of power 
relations, where the exercise of individual Wills is always relative, always contingent, 
never in isolation from the Will of ‘the Other’. Power relations are everywhere, and in 
VSD, particularly when applied in the context of age-related cognitive decline where 
personhood is frequently so occluded that the scales of such relations lie heavily against 
the independence of those in the midst of them, attention must be paid to weighting such 
independence for the person with dementia as carefully as possible. Technologies, includ-
ing assistive technologies, are always pregnant with power relations. VSD, therefore, 
must understand power, and operate within a framework that is sensitive to its workings 
(Kreps 2018). 
Brey’s (2007)framework for a critical understanding of technology’s impact upon the 
social is instructive and useful in this context: “A critical theory of this sort requires the 
development of an answer to four questions: (1) the theoretical question: how can tech-
nology play a role in the distribution and exercise of power? (2) the factual question: 
What is the role of technology in the distribution and exercise of power in contemporary 
society? (3) the normative question: What role should technology have in the distribution 
and exercise of power in society? and (4) the practical question: What steps can be taken 
to move closer to this ideal?”. The first three questions - theoretical, factual and norma-
tive - enable us to develop and envisage “policies and practices for the realization of a 
society in which technology is a force for empowerment rather than for domination”. 
The fourth – practical– question gives rise to the practice of VSD. What is most crucial, 
however, to draw from Brey’s framework, is that practitioners of VSD should be well 
versed in understandings of the first three questions, if they are to avoid reinforcing pow-
er structures within society opposed to the “human well-being; human dignity (respect); 
justice; welfare…; human rights …; and freedom” (Burmeister et al 2011)valued by 
VSD. VSD practitioners need to be clear about the exercise of power, which for the de-
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signer of technological artefacts should always be as intentional as possible, rather than 
intuitive or unconscious, in order best to steer clear of the potential traps of the politics of 
artefacts(Winner 1986:2-10). For Winner, technology is infused with politics: it is at the 
very least politics by other means. Technological artefacts are often nothing less than 
objects created to "enhance the power, authority, and privilege of some over oth-
ers."(Winner 1986:2-10). Brey’sframework, again, is instructive, here. “The preliminary 
answer to the normative question is… that the role of technology should be such that it 
aids in the arrangement of power so that the ideals of democracy, freedom and justice are 
attained as well as possible”(Brey 2007).Assuming that “power relations are both estab-
lished by the actions of agents and by the workings of social structures,” (Brey 2007) 
VSD practitioners should also note that, “although power relations do not require inten-
tionality, the exercise of power always does”(Brey 2007). Such exercise is often opaque, 
and more complex than it may at first seem. 
As Brey reminds us “Technology can help agents exercise power over others by either 
giving them new powers or by improving the efficiency, effectiveness, reliability and 
ease by which existing powers are exercised”(Brey 2007). Brey distinguishes between 
‘power over,’ whereby power is exercised for the control of others, and ‘power to,’ a per-
sonal empowerment towards achievement. VSD needs at times to navigate very complex 
interfaces between sometimes competing pressures and be prepared to reach sometimes 
imperfect compromises where the requirements of social structures (power over the 
process) constrain the scope of design (power to influence relations). Thus, an awareness 
of power relations amongst practitioners of VSD is crucial to reaching the best compro-
mise, however imperfect, if VSD is to achieve any progress towards “the realization of a 
society in which technology is a force for empowerment rather than for domina-
tion”(Brey 2007). 
VSD, in other words, needs a critical understanding of technology’s impact upon society, 
and to be clear whether it is either (a) making ‘inherently political technologies’ that 
promote disempowering social power structures more socially acceptable and accessible, 
or (b) contributing to technologies that aid the “arrangement of power so that the ideals of 
democracy, freedom and justice are attained as well as possible”(Brey 2007). It is pre-
cisely for these reasons that this paper uses the lens of personhood to interpret the litera-
ture on VSD usage for technologies addressing the domain of cognitive decline in ageing. 
Conclusion: Power, Technology and Personhood in 
VSD 
Those experiencing age-related cognitive decline, for whom social personhood is becom-
ing gradually concealed, and for whom lucidity is most often associated with their rela-
tionships with their relatives and carers, are uniquely vulnerable within the network of 
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power relations exercised by both those around them and the webs of technological appa-
ratus in which they sit, both medical and assistive. As pointed out above, VSD ought to 
focus upon supporting relationships, and upon respecting the social personhood of those 
nearing the end of their physical lives. It must also, in light of the above discussion of 
power with respect to technologies, do so in a manner that acknowledges the inherently 
political potential of technologies, and aligns the politics of assistive technologies not just 
towards relationships but towards equal and just relations with relatives and carers, that 
respect the autonomy of patients for whom, on the physical level at least, there is often 
little freedom left. 
In the regimen of hospitals, of care homes, and of sheltered housing, where it is always 
time for something, in the busy schedules of those charged with the care of people no 
longer able to fend (entirely) for themselves, assistive technologies need not only to free-
up time for busy professionals to attend to other patients, care home inmates, or sheltered 
housing tenants. They need also to work towards empowering those they are assisting, 
and especially in the case of age-related cognitive decline, they need to work towards 
revealing, rather than inadvertently supporting the concealment, of social personhood. 
They can achieve this not only by supporting the relationships, but by supporting contin-
ued choice and autonomy within those relationships. These, in short, are the values that 
VSD should be sensitive to, in respect of assistive technologies for age-related cognitive 
decline. 
In the final analysis, there is the possibility that those experiencing age-related cognitive 
decline may see improvements and enhancements in what could be described as their 
social capital (Coleman 1988), in contexts where the use of VSD in the design of assis-
tive technologies in place in their care regime are working effectively to support their 
social personhood in the face of the concealments brought on by physical decline. 
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